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Non-Technical Summary 
 
While much research has been done on the causes and effects of mergers, surprisingly little 
exists on the causes of merger waves. Recently, however, several theories have appeared that 
claim to account for merger waves. Two of these make the standard assumptions of 
neoclassical economics – managers maximize shareholder wealth, capital markets are 
efficient (see, Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) and Harford (2005)). The other theories might 
best be characterized, however, as behavioral in that they relax one or more of these standard 
assumptions (Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004), Shleifer and Vishny (2003), and 
Gugler, Mueller and Yurtoglu (2007)). The behavioral theories take into account the 
psychology of stock markets and, thus, give explanations for both why merger waves occur, 
and why they tend to coincide with stock market booms. 
In this article we use a natural way to discriminate between the effects of "real" changes in 
the economy, like technological advances, and the effects of pure stock market phenomena, 
like overvaluation, on merger activity, by looking at both, listed and unlisted acquirers. If real 
changes in the economy are responsible for merger activity, as the neoclassical theories 
claim, we would expect that both types of firms are equally affected. Moreover, unlisted 
firms cannot be overvalued, at least not by the stock market, and they cannot trade their 
overvalued stocks for less overvalued stocks, as one of the behavioral theories argues. 
We present evidence that merger waves occurred in all three areas at the end of the 20th 
century – the USA, UK and Continental Europe. These waves were almost exclusively 
confined to companies listed on stock exchanges in all three areas, which gives support to the 
behavioral hypotheses that claim that merger waves are driven by stock market bubbles. We 
present regression results, which offer further support for these hypotheses. 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
 
Die meisten Fusionsstudien beschäftigen sich mit den Determinanten und Effekten von 
Fusionen, aber nur sehr wenige mit den Gründen von Fusionswellen. Zwei der Theorien zur 
Erklärung von Fusionswellen (Tobin's q und Industry Shocks) beruhen auf den 
Standardannahmen neoklassischer Ökonomie: Manager maximieren das Aktionärsvermögen 
und Kapitalmärkte sind effizient (Jovanovic und Rousseau (2002) und Harford (2005)). Die 
zwei anderen Theorien (Overvaluation und Manager-Discretion) können am besten als 
"behavioural" bezeichnet werden, weil sie diese Annahmen abschwächen (Rhodes-Kropf und 
Viswanathan (2004), Shleifer und Vishny (2003), und Gugler, Mueller und Yurtoglu (2007)). 
Diese Verhaltenstheorien berücksichtigen explizit die Psychologie der (Aktien)märkte und 
geben Erklärungen, warum Fusionen in Wellen auftreten und warum diese mit 
Aktienmarktbooms zusammenfallen. 
In dieser Studie diskriminieren wir zwischen "realen" Änderungen in der Ökonomie, wie 
technologischen Schocks, und reinen Aktienmarktphenomenen, wie Überbewertungen, 
indem wir beide Arten von Firmen, börsennotierte sowie nicht-börsennotierte, analysieren. 
Wenn reale Änderungen in der Ökonomie für die Fusionsaktivitäten verantwortlich zeichnen, 
so sollten beide Arten von Firmen gleichermaßen betroffen sein. Zudem können nicht-
börsennotierte Firmen nicht überwertet sein, zumindest nicht vom Aktienmarkt, sodass sie 
ihre überbewerteten Aktien nicht für weniger überbewertete Aktien tauschen können. 
Wir präsentieren Evidenz dafür, dass Fusionen in den drei Regionen - USA, UK und 
Kontinentaleuropa - in Wellen auftreten. Diese Fusionswellen existieren aber fast 
ausschließlich nur für börsennotierte Firmen, was die Verhaltenstheorien unterstützt, welche 
als Gründe für die Fusionswellen die Aktienmarktübertreibungen ansehen. Unsere 
Regressionsanalyse unterstützt diese These weiter. 
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Abstract 
 
One of the most conspicuous features of mergers is that they come in waves that are 
correlated with increases in share prices and price/earnings ratios. We use a natural way to 
discriminate between pure stock market influences on firm decisions and other influences by 
examining merger patterns for both listed and unlisted firms. If "real" changes in the 
economy drive merger waves, as some neoclassical theories of mergers predict, both listed 
and unlisted firms should experience waves. We find significant differences between listed 
and unlisted firms as predicted by behavioral theories of merger waves.  
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 Mergers have been a topic of considerable interest in the United States for at least a 
century. Following the first great merger wave that began at the end of the 19th century, 
several studies tried to explain its causes and effects.1 An “impelling force” behind the 
mergers was “a wave of frenzied speculation in asset values” (Markham, 1955). Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, therefore, the average merger during the wave proved to be unprofitable 
(Hogarty, 1970). 
 Subsequent merger waves in the United States have also coincided with strong 
stock market advances, and this pattern can be regarded as a major regularity in aggregate 
merger data.2 Less consensus exists over whether mergers during subsequent waves have 
been profitable or not.3 
Merger waves have also occurred in the United Kingdom.4 Outside of the United 
States, the United Kingdom and a few other Anglo-Saxon countries little research has been 
done on mergers, and essentially no studies exist on whether merger waves also occur in non-
Anglo-Saxon countries, and if so, whether their causes are the same as in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries. This paper seeks to fill this void by examining merger activity in the United States, 
the United Kingdom and Continental Europe over the period 1991-2004. 
While much research has been done on the causes and effects of mergers, surprisingly 
little exists on the causes of merger waves. Recently, however, several theories have 
appeared that claim to account for merger waves. Two of these make the standard 
assumptions of neoclassical economics – managers maximize shareholder wealth, capital 
markets are efficient.5 The other theories might best be characterized, however, as behavioral 
in that they relax one or more of these standard assumptions.6 The behavioral theories take 
into account the psychology of stock markets and, thus, give explanations for both why 
merger waves occur, and why they tend to coincide with stock market booms. 
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 There is reason to expect that mergers may be less frequent in Continental Europe 
than in the United States and the United Kingdom, and that they may have different causes. 
Because of widely dispersed share ownership in the United States and the United Kingdom, a 
“market for corporate control” exists in both countries where one company can buy a 
majority of another company’s shares and merge it into itself, even if the managers of the 
target company oppose the merger. In contrast, share ownership is much more concentrated 
in Continental Europe making it difficult for two companies to merge, if the major 
shareholders of one are opposed to the deal. This difference between institutions in 
Continental Europe and in Anglo-Saxon countries may lead to differences in both aggregate 
merger activity and its causes. 
 In this article we use a natural way to discriminate between the effects of "real" 
changes in the economy, like technological advances, and the effects of pure stock market 
phenomena, like overvaluation, on merger activity, by looking at both, listed and unlisted 
acquirers. If real changes in the economy are responsible for merger activity, as the 
neoclassical theories claim, we would expect that both types of firms are equally affected. 
Moreover, unlisted firms cannot be overvalued, at least not by the stock market, and they 
cannot trade their overvalued stocks for less overvalued stocks, as one of the behavioral 
theories argues. Thus, similar patterns in the two types of mergers is inconsistent with this 
theory.  
 We present evidence that merger waves occurred in all three areas at the end of the 
20th century – the USA, UK and Continental Europe. These waves were almost exclusively 
confined to companies listed on stock exchanges in all three areas, which gives support to the 
behavioral hypotheses that claim that merger waves are driven by stock market bubbles. We 
present regression results, which offer further support for these hypotheses.  
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 The plan of the article is as follows. We first present evidence that merger waves did 
indeed occur in each of the three areas. In Section II, we review some hypotheses, which 
have been put forward to explain merger waves. Section III presents regression results that 
are consistent with two behavioral theories of merger waves. Some conclusions are drawn in 
the final section. 
I. The Pattern of Merger Activity, 1991-2004 
A. Data Sources 
 The information on mergers comes from the database “Worldwide Mergers & 
Acquisitions”, which is produced by Thomson Financial Securities Data (TFSD). It includes 
all corporate transactions involving at least 5 per cent of the ownership of a company with a 
transaction value (deal value) of at least 1 million US dollars. Public and private transactions 
are covered. In total, for the period 1978 to June 2005, TFSD records 100,233 deals for the 
five European countries that we have examined: Austria, Germany, Italy, France and United 
Kingdom. 
 A necessary task was to combine the transactions with the financial data available 
from the Amadeus database from Bureau van Dijk. To this end, we applied an approximate 
string matching algorithm, matching via company names for each country. All of the 
automatic matches below a certain similarity threshold were checked manually, amounting to 
about 24,000 deals. We could match 52.6 per cent of all transactions to an Amadeus 
company. Data restrictions reduce the sample available for estimation considerably (see 
Table 1 below). Besides the financial data, we also used the information on the largest 
shareholder from Amadeus whenever available. To obtain financial information for the US 
sample, we combined the TFSD data with the Global Vantage database (GV). GV contains 
financial information for listed companies. TFSD lists 193,015 US deals. Once again, the 
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number of deals we could use was to a large extent predetermined by data restrictions. Table 
1 shows the number of deals in TFSD, the share of deals matched and the reasons for 
reducing the number of deals as originally reported in TFSD. 
 We also calculate the price-earnings (P/E) ratio using GV. The result is a single 
number for every year (1991-2004) and every country (Austria, France, Germany, Italy, UK, 
USA) in our sample. It was derived for all the companies where data were available for a 
particular year on the variables “income before extraordinary items” (inc) and “market value” 
(mv) (P/E=mv/inc). Each observation is calculated as a weighted sum of the individual P/E 
ratios, with market values as weights. 
B. Merger Patterns 
 Figures 1-3 present the numbers of completed mergers and total deal values for the 
USA, UK and Continental Europe over the period 1991 to 2004. The numbers of mergers for 
each year are given along the left vertical axes, with total deal values along the right axes. It 
is readily apparent that all three areas experienced merger waves at the end of the 1990s.7 
Table 2 presents the numbers of domestic and cross-border mergers for the three areas. 
Waves in both types of mergers are again readily apparent.  
 The behavioral hypotheses discussed in the next section link merger waves to the 
psychology and optimism in the stock market. In Figures 4-6, we present the curves 
indicating the total deal values of the acquisitions by listed and unlisted companies in each 
area, and weighted averages of company P/E ratios using company market values as weights. 
The time series are represented as indices to ease comparison between the groups. Mergers 
by listed companies can be seen to peak in all three areas near the peaks of the weighted 
average P/E ratios. No waves are visible for mergers by unlisted companies in the UK and 
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Continental Europe, however, and only a small blip in acquisitions by non-listed firms 
occurred in the USA, and its peak lagged the peak for listed companies by about two years. 
 That there was no wave for unlisted acquirers but only for listed acquirers is also 
evident in mean statistics. For example, the total of deal values of the acquisitions by listed 
firms increases 4-fold (USA), 4.5-fold (UK) and 6(!)-fold for Continental Europe in wave 
years as compared to non-wave years. This compares to only modest increases for unlisted 
firms. Moreover, if common shocks either to specific industries or to the whole economy 
were responsible for the observed wave pattern of merger activity, one would expect a large 
correlation between listed and unlisted firm merger activity particularly during wave years 
(since the common shock caused it). Table 3 presents evidence to the opposite. The 
correlation coefficients between (quarterly) listed and unlisted firm merger activity decrease 
in wave years, most markedly in the USA from 0.8 in non-wave years to 0.06 in wave years 
(UK: from 0.4 to 0.1; CE: from 0.24 to 0.2). Thus, there is a complete decoupling of merger 
activity between listed and unlisted acquirers during waves! 
 As we shall see in the next section, these patterns are inconsistent with the predictions 
of two neoclassical theories of merger waves, but are precisely what one anticipates from the 
behavioral hypotheses. 
II. Theories of Merger Waves 
 In this section we discuss the main hypotheses that have been put forward to explain 
merger waves and whether or not they are consistent with the patterns of mergers presented 
in Section I. In the next section, we present some regression results testing the different 
hypotheses. We first discuss two neoclassical theories of merger waves and then go on to the 
behavioral theories. 
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A. The q-Theory of Mergers 
 Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002a) (hereafter J&R) extend the q-theory of investment to 
mergers, and claim that this extended q-theory can account for merger waves. They liken 
mergers to the purchase of used plant and equipment, and argue that the gap between the qs 
of potential acquiring firms and targets increases at particular points – as during a stock 
market boom – and this widening difference leads managers to favor purchasing other firms 
over used capital equipment thus creating a merger wave. 
 Under the q-theory of investment, when a firm’s return on its capital stock exceeds its 
cost of capital, q > 1, and it expands its capital stock. A straightforward extension of the 
theory to mergers would imply that firms with qs > 1 can profitably expand by acquiring 
assets either in the form of capital investment or other firms.8 Since q measures returns on a 
firm’s existing assets, it would seem that the q-theory would only allow one to explain 
horizontal mergers, i.e., additions to existing capital stock.  
An alternative interpretation of the q-theory would be that q > 1 does not necessarily 
imply that a firm can profitably expand by acquiring more assets in its base industry, but that 
it is well managed and could profitably expand in any direction.9 Tobin’s q under this 
interpretation is not a measure of the quality of a firm’s assets, but of its management. A 
stock market boom represents a massive revaluation of the talents of managers, which 
produces a merger wave.  
An obvious question raised by this explanation for merger waves is what caused the 
market to change its beliefs about the talents of managers? In other work J&R (2002b) have 
argued that stock market booms are caused by major technological advances like the 
invention and spread of the automobile. The late-1990s stock market boom was a result of 
innovations in the general area of information technology that also led to increased 
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opportunities for profitable mergers. Although this seems like a plausible explanation for 
both stock market booms and their accompanying merger waves, it is difficult to reconcile 
this interpretation of the q-theory to the merger patterns shown in Section I. Major 
technological changes affect all companies in an economy, not just those listed on stock 
exchanges. If the rise in stock prices at the end of the 20th century reflected an increased 
potential for making profitable acquisitions due to common, underlying technological factors, 
then all firms, not just listed companies, should have experienced merger waves. This is 
particularly true for Continental Europe, since a much larger fraction of its economic activity 
is conducted by non-listed firms. 
B. The Industry Shocks Theory 
 Where J&R’s explanation for merger waves appears to rest on an assumed, 
underlying common technological shock, Harford’s (2005) theory assumes the existence of 
numerous different shocks – some technological, some regulatory, and some taking on still 
other forms. At certain times these shocks buffet several industries simultaneously and 
produce a wave of mergers across the entire economy. Harford’s “neoclassical explanation of 
merger waves” is thus vulnerable to the same criticism as the q-theory – any industry shocks 
should hit listed and unlisted firms alike and produce merger waves across both types of 
companies. 
C. The Managerial Discretion Theory 
Under the managerial discretion theory, managers get utility from their firms’ growth either 
because their incomes are tied to growth, or because they get “psychic income” from 
managing a larger firm.10 The constraint on the pursuit of growth is the threat of takeover, 
which is inversely related to q. Thus, managers’ utility can be expressed as a function of the 
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growth of their firms, g and q, ( ),U U g q= , where 0U g∂ ∂ > , 22 0U g <∂∂ , 0U q∂ ∂ > , 
and 22 0U q <∂∂ .11 
Defining M as the amount of assets acquired through mergers, and setting g = g(M), 
we can maximize ( ),U g q  with respect to M to determine the utility maximizing level of 
growth through mergers. This yields the following first order condition: 
  (1) ( / )( / ) ( / )( /U g g M U q q M∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ = − ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ )
Since 0U g∂ ∂ > , , and /g M∂ ∂ > 0 0U q∂ ∂ > , (1) cannot be satisfied if 0q M∂ ∂ > . For 
any merger that increases q no tradeoff between growth and security from takeovers exists. 
Growth-maximizing managers undertake all mergers that increase q. Their behavior differs 
from managers who maximize shareholder wealth only with respect to mergers that decrease 
q. Figure 7 depicts the relationship in eq. 1 for mergers that lower q. When no mergers of this 
type are undertaken, q is at its maximum and the risk of takeover is minimized. When the 
relationship between q and M yields a ( )( ) 0NU q q M− ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ > , a utility-maximizing 
manager undertakes MN of value destroying mergers. 
During stock market booms the degree of optimism in the market rises dramatically. 
As Galbraith (1961, p. 8) observed, an “indispensable element of fact” during stock market 
bubbles is that individuals “build a world of speculative make-believe. This is a world 
inhabited not by people who have to be persuaded to believe but by people who want an 
excuse to believe.” These excuses to believe take the form of “theories” as to why share 
prices should rise to unprecedented levels, why the economy has entered a “new era” (Shiller, 
2000, Ch. 5). Prominent among these are “theories” about wealth increases from mergers. 
The market begins to believe that certain types of mergers – by conglomerates in the 1960s, 
media companies in the 1990s – will generate synergies and the announcement of these types 
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of mergers is greeted favorably. Managers are free to undertake such mergers without fear of 
their company’s share price taking a steep fall. 
Thus, merger announcements, that would under normal conditions result in large 
declines in acquirers’ share prices, produce only modest declines during a stock market 
boom, or even share price increases. This shifts ( )( )U q q M− ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  to the right, as in Figure 
7. The firm acquires more assets through mergers, MB, since q does not drop by as much or 
perhaps even rises when a merger is announced. 
Under the managerial discretion theory, merger waves occur during stock market 
booms, because the optimism prevailing in the market allows growth-seeking managers to 
undertake more wealth-destroying mergers than they safely can under normal market 
conditions. This is not the case for non-listed firms, since for them the takeover constraint 
and/or the monitoring intensity by the owners of closely-held companies are not affected by 
temporary stock market booms. 
D. The Overvalued Shares Theory  
 Shleifer and Vishny (2003) (hereafter S&V) retain the neoclassical assumption that 
managers maximize shareholders’ wealth (at least as far as the acquiring firms are 
concerned), but relax the assumptions that mergers create wealth and of capital market 
efficiency. Some firms’ share prices become overvalued during stock market booms. Their 
managers know their shares are overvalued, and wish to protect their shareholders from the 
wealth loss that will come when the market lowers its estimates to their warranted levels. 
They accomplish this by exchanging their overvalued shares for the real assets of another 
company. Targets’ managers are assumed to have short time horizons, so they too gain by 
“cashing in” their stakes in their firms at favorable terms. Merger waves occur, because the 
number of overvalued companies increases during a stock market boom.  
 9
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) also predict merger waves during stock 
market booms, but offer a different explanation for why target managers accept overvalued 
shares. They claim that the optimism in the market during a boom makes it difficult for target 
managers to judge whether the price of a bidder’s shares is high due to over optimism, or 
because it reflects the expected synergies from the merger, and thus they mistakenly become 
willing partners in mergers that do not generate synergies. 
 Neither version of the overvaluation theory can, however, explain the merger activity 
of non-listed firms. Their shares cannot be overvalued, at least not by the stock market, and 
they cannot trade overvalued stocks for less overvalued stocks.  
III. Tests of the Theories 
The behavioral theories rest on assumptions about the optimism or over optimism in the stock 
market. They thus predict different patterns of merger activity for companies listed on stock 
exchanges and unlisted companies. We have already observed such differences in aggregate 
merger patterns in Section I, in this section we present additional evidence by estimating 
models of the assets acquired by individual companies. The key prediction is that the amount 
of assets acquired by listed companies is sensitive to the aggregate P/E ratio, which we treat 
as a measure of the degree of optimism in the market, while the amount of assets acquired by 
unlisted companies does not depend on the aggregate P/E.  
The managerial discretion theory assumes the existence of an Anglo-Saxon 
institutional structure – specifically widely dispersed share ownership. As the fraction of 
shares held by the largest shareholder increases, the cost to them of wealth-destroying 
mergers increases. The managerial discretion theory thus predicts a negative relationship 
between the fraction of shares held by the largest shareholder and the assets a company 
acquires.  
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The overvaluation theory makes the opposite prediction. The more shares the largest 
shareholder of an overvalued company has, the greater is her personal gain from trading them 
for the assets of another company. Thus, the overvaluation theory should predict a positive 
coefficient on the largest shareholder’s shareholdings for listed companies, and a zero 
coefficient for unlisted companies, since the market places no value on them. If we assume 
that the managers of unlisted companies might also be empire-builders, then a negative 
coefficient for the largest shareholders’ of ownership stake can also be expected.  
For a firm that overinvests, the marginal return on investment is below its neoclassical 
cost of capital. Raising funds externally will seem more expensive than using internal cash 
flows. Cash flows have, therefore, been a key variable in the literature for distinguishing 
between the managerial discretion and neoclassical theories of the determinants of investment 
and R&D.12 Cash flows are thus included in our model, as an additional way to discriminate 
the managerial discretion theory from the others.13 
The bigger a firm is, the more expensive it is to take it over and replace its 
management. Thus, managers of large companies have more discretion to pursue their own 
goals and the managerial discretion theory predicts a positive coefficient on firm size. None 
of the other theories makes a prediction for this variable, although one might also simply 
think of it as a control variable. We also include leverage as an additional control variable. 
Since debt is one source of finance for mergers, one might predict a negative coefficient on 
debt – the higher a company’s debt, the more constrained it is in financing acquisitions by 
issuing debt. On the other hand, high leverage may be due to past mergers and may signal a 
growth-oriented management. This logic predicts a positive coefficient on debt. 
The basic model estimated thus looks as follows: 
 Mit = a + bP/Et + cSit + dCFit-1 + eln(A)it + fLevit + μit  (2) 
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where Mit is the assets acquired relative to the acquirer’s total assets in year t by firm i, P/Et is 
the weighted average P/E in t, Sit is the fraction of outstanding shares held by firm i’s largest 
shareholder, CFit-1 is firm cash flows, ln(A)it is the natural log of total assets, Levit is 
leverage, and μit is the error term. Eq. 2 is estimated separately for the United Kingdom and 
Continental Europe with separate coefficients estimated for each variable for listed and 
unlisted companies. 
Unfortunately, our data source did not provide data on acquisitions by unlisted US 
companies, so the model could only be estimated for listed firms. We present these estimates 
for the United States for comparison purposes, although they do not allow us to discriminate 
between the different theories as well as when we have data for both types of companies. 
Since all US companies are listed, we are also able to include Tobin’s q in the equation. The 
managerial discretion, overvaluation and q-theories all predict a positive coefficient on this 
variable. 
Table 4 presents the means of the variables used in the regression analysis except that 
we have presented mean total assets rather than mean log of assets, which is the variable in 
the regressions. A –L next to a variable indicates that it is a mean for listed companies. An 
NA prior to a variable indicates a mean for non-acquiring companies, which serve as the 
control group in the regression analysis. The average size of an acquisition by a listed 
company is largest for Continental Europe and smallest for the UK. Largest shareholder’s 
fraction of ownership is largest for Continental Europe and smallest for the USA. 
Unsurprisingly, listed companies have smaller holdings of its largest shareholder than 
unlisted companies. Cash flows as a fraction of total assets do not vary greatly except for the 
USA, where acquirers’ cash flows average more than double those of non-acquirers. Listed 
companies are generally bigger than non-listed companies, acquirers are bigger than non-
acquirers. Acquirers have higher qs than non-acquirers. 
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Our models might be estimated twice, once as a probit regression to determine the 
probability that a company undertakes an acquisition, and a second time as a Tobit regression 
to take into account differences in the sizes of the targets. Both probit and Tobit regressions 
were estimated, but only the Tobit results are reported, because they differ from the probit 
results only with respect to the sizes of the coefficients on the different variables. That is to 
say, the same variables that explain whether or not a firm undertakes a merger in a particular 
year explain the amount of assets acquired. The close similarity between the results for the 
probit and Tobit estimations also implies that there was little to be gained from adopting 
Heckman’s (1976) two-stage estimation procedure for censored data. 
Table 5 presents the regression results. The numbers in parentheses are t-values. The 
t-value on the coefficient for unlisted companies is for a comparison with zero. The t-value 
next to the listed companies (-L) is for a test of whether its coefficient is significantly 
different from that for the unlisted companies. The coefficients for the listed companies are 
the differences from the unlisted coefficients.  
The coefficient on the weighted average P/E ratio for unlisted companies in the UK is 
-0.006 and is significant at the one per cent level. Unlisted companies actually buy fewer 
assets through mergers when share prices are relatively high. This may be because the prices 
of possible targets rise during a stock market boom making the purchase of other companies 
more expensive.14 The coefficient on the P/E ratio is both significantly greater for listed 
companies and positive as predicted by both the managerial and overvaluation theories.  
The shares held by the largest shareholder in the UK are negatively related to assets 
acquired with the coefficient for listed companies being three times larger than for unlisted 
companies. This result is consistent with the managerial discretion hypothesis, but contradicts 
the overvaluation hypothesis. If the motivation behind mergers is to trade overvalued shares 
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for real assets, then one would expect large (controlling) shareholders to be more eager to 
make acquisitions, the larger their own shareholdings are.  
Cash flows, size and leverage are all positively related to assets acquired for the UK, 
with the coefficient on cash flows being twice as large for listed companies. These results are 
consistent with the managerial discretion hypothesis, and suggest that in the UK leverage is 
associated with aggressive managements, which have undertaken mergers in the past. When 
the sample is restricted to listed companies, and Tobin’s q is added, all variables retain the 
same signs as before and are significant. Tobin’s q picks up a positive and significant 
coefficient in the sample of listed companies. 
The results for the two key variables in the model – the P/E ratio and largest 
shareholder’s holdings – are quite similar for Continental Europe. Unlisted companies are 
less active buying other companies when share prices are high, listed companies are more 
active. Merger activity falls as the largest shareholder’s ownership stake rises.  
Size continues to have a positive influence on assets acquired in Continental Europe, 
but leverage is insignificant and cash flows actually pick up negative coefficients, although 
only the coefficient for the listed companies is statistically significant. Tobin’s q again has a 
positive and significant coefficient when the sample is limited to listed companies.  
All coefficients in the US regression are statistically significant, with the sign pattern 
being consistent with the managerial discretion hypothesis. Higher cash flows and market 
optimism lead to the acquisition of more assets, while higher ownership of the largest 
shareholder reduces the amount of assets acquired.  
The comparison of two point estimates illustrates the magnitude of the effects of the 
P/E ratio. Column 1 of Table 6 shows the expected values for merger activity in our samples. 
It is denoted as E(y|x) to indicate that it is for the censored outcome. Because we have large 
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comparison groups of non-merging companies, they are not high: 0.016 per cent, 0.113 per 
cent and 2.75 per cent for Continental Europe, UK and the US, respectively. The expected 
value for the truncated outcome, E(y|y>0,x), provides the average value of assets acquired, 
given an acquisition was undertaken. For listed firms, the conditional expected value for 
Continental Europe is 17.7 per cent at a P/E of 15 compared to 13.9 per cent for non-listed 
firms. The effect of a rise in the P/E ratio to 30, a reasonable number during the stock market 
boom, on listed firms is striking: the difference is almost four percentage points for listed 
firms, whereas the expectation is diminished by almost one percentage point for non-listed 
firms. The same pattern can be observed for the UK and the result for the sample of listed 
US-firms is also consistent with this interpretation. 
Also in Table 6 are the partial effects of changes in P/E, ∂E(y|x)/∂(P/E). In the Tobit 
model, they are not constant, are much higher for listed firms than for non-listed firms, and 
are largest for listed firms in a stock market boom at a P/E of 30. The decomposition of the 
partial effects, as presented in McDonald and Moffitt (1980), shows that for listed firms the 
relative contributions of acquisition size and the number of acquisitions do not change 
dramatically during stock market booms. (The contribution of acquisition size increases from 
11 per cent to 15 per cent, when the P/E ratio increases from 15 to 30.) Thus, the main 
explanation for merger waves is the dramatic increase in the number of acquisitive firms 
during stock market booms, not an increase in the size of acquisition. Moreover, the results 
are similar for the UK and the US, though the fact that relatively more firms are above the 
threshold (i.e. making acquisitions) puts more weight on the change attributed to increases in 
the size of the acquisitions. 
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IV. Conclusions 
Merger waves occurred in the United States, United Kingdom and Continental Europe at the 
end of the 20th century. In all three areas, the peaks of the merger waves coincided more or 
less with the peaks of stock market booms. In the United Kingdom and Continental Europe, 
the merger waves were confined exclusively to companies listed on the major stock 
exchanges. Although a modest wave (ripple) in acquisitions by unlisted companies was 
observed in the United States, it was dwarfed by the wave for listed companies’ acquisitions, 
and was out of phase with both the stock market boom and the wave in listed company 
mergers. These patterns are inconsistent with the neoclassical theories of merger waves that 
posit some underlying common shock to the entire economy driving a merger wave, or a set 
of simultaneous shocks to a group of industries, since such shocks should produce similar 
merger patterns for both listed and unlisted companies. 
Additional evidence in favor of the behavioral theories was found in the regression 
results. These results were quite similar for listed companies in the United States and United 
Kingdom. The aggregate P/E, cash flows, size, leverage and Tobin’s q all had positive and 
significant coefficients in these two countries for listed firms, while the shareholdings of the 
largest owners of the acquirers were negatively related to the amount of assets acquired. This 
last result was also observed for Continental European and seems to favor the managerial 
discretion over the overvaluation hypothesis. Growth oriented managers with large 
controlling shareholders in their companies should be less free to undertake wealth-
destroying mergers. The overvaluation hypothesis assumes that acquirers’ managers are 
trying to protect their shareholders from future declines in their companies’ share prices. 
Under this hypothesis, managers with large personal stakes in their firms should be more 
eager to make acquisitions. 
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The results for Continental Europe differed in some respects from those for the two 
Anglo-Saxon countries. Leverage does appear to be a signal of the aggressiveness of 
managers in pursuing growth in Continental Europe, and assets acquired are unrelated to cash 
flows for unlisted companies, and negatively related for listed firms. This latter result 
contradicts the managerial discretion hypothesis. On the other hand, the coefficients on the 
aggregate P/E, largest owners’ shareholdings, size and Tobin’s q are all consistent with the 
managerial discretion theory. Thus, even for Continental Europe we think that the managerial 
discretion theory offers a better explanation for the merger wave than either of the two 
neoclassical theories or the overvaluation hypothesis.  
Despite the differences in regression results between Continental Europe and the two 
Anglo-Saxon countries, we think that the similarities across the three areas outweigh the 
differences. Merger waves occurred in all three areas at the end of the 20th century, when 
stock markets were booming. Managers took advantage of the optimism in the stock market 
to acquire other companies. In all three areas, however, the enthusiasm of managers for 
mergers was dampened, if their company was not listed on a stock exchange and/or there was 
a large shareholder in the company. 
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Figure 1: Number and Total Deal Values of all Mergers for the US 
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Figure 2: Number and Total Deal Values of all Mergers for the UK 
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Figure 3: Number and Total Deal Values of all Mergers for Continental Europe 
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Figure 4: Total Deal Values of listed vs. not-listed acquirers, and P/E for the US 
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Figure 5: Total Deal Values of listed vs. not-listed acquirers, and P/E for the UK 
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Figure 6: Total Deal Values of listed vs. not-listed acquirers, and P/E for Continental 
Europe 
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Figure 7: The Managerial Trade-off 
 
 
 
Table 1: Deals from Europe (Austria, Germany, France, Italy, UK), matched to 
Amadeus for 1991-2004, and deals from the US, matched to Global Vantage for 1991-
2002 
Deals Restriction Share Available 
Europe US  Europe US 
100,233 193,015 TFSD deal matched to Amadeus/GV 0.526 0.241
52,727 1978<= year <= June 2005 (rest: no year) 0.783 
41,268 1991<= year <= 2004 (1) 0.855 
35,290 37,867 one deal (largest) per year & company (2),(3) 0.651 0.526
22,997 19,914 deal value available 0.514 0.635
11,821 12,648 necessary financial data in Amadeus 0.631 0.839
7,457 10,612 share of largest owner available 0.430 0.241
3,207 2,560 final sample  
 
(1) Sample for US ends 2002 
(2) Europe: Yearly deals per company: min=1, max=25, average=1.53 
(3) US: Yearly deals per company: min=1, max=86, average=1.90 
TFSD: Thompson Financial Securities Data 
GV: Global Vantage Database 
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Table 2: Domestic vs. Cross-border Mergers 
  US  UK  Continental Europe 
year  domestic cross-border domestic cross-border domestic cross-border 
1991  2991 371  884 305  1490 417 
1992  3392 443  975 262  1341 362 
1993  3780 527  1021 280  1054 295 
1994  4495 634  1208 332  1371 407 
1995  5447 800  1476 395  1349 466 
1996  6140 964  1448 420  1172 409 
1997  7109 1132  1805 483  1089 418 
1998  8277 1423  2087 528  957 551 
1999  6866 1218  2118 661  1531 869 
2000  6387 1313  2143 701  1969 1087 
2001  4835 947  1844 584  1401 796 
2002  4535 671  1538 359  1037 480 
2003  4813 682  1411 364  884 398 
2004  5734 982  1474 464  1103 426 
 
 
 
Table 3: Correlation coefficients between total deal values by listed acquirers and total 
deal values by not-listed acquirers 
  wave non-wave 
US: listed,not-listed 0.0597 0.8061
  (0.7629) (0.0000)
UK: listed,not-listed 0.1040 0.3972
  (0.6625) (0.0076)
Cont. Eur: listed,not-listed 0.2041 0.2329
  (0.3880) (0.1282)
 
Note: p-values in parentheses. Quarterly data was used to calculate these correlations. 
wave-period: UK and CE, 1997q1-2001q4; US, 1995q1-2002q4. 
non-wave period: UK and CE, 1989q1-1996q4 and 2002q1-2004q4; 
US, 1989q1-1994q4 and 2003q1-2004q4. 
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Table 4: Variable Means Wave/Non-Wave 
    UK Cont.Eur. USA 
M non-wave 42.09 97.12   
wave 65.46 140.04   
M-L non-wave 92.13 299.34 159.89
wave 248.21 562.23 450.5
S non-wave 89.88 78.11   
wave 90.94 73.39   
S-L non-wave 18.74 44.64 19.51
wave 16.69 41.7 18.17
NA S non-wave 91.06 74.82   
wave 89.18 74.68   
NA S-L non-wave 35.05 60.78 22
wave 29.66 60.83 21.68
CF non-wave 0.087 0.075   
wave 0.083 0.06   
CF-L non-wave 0.087 0.073 0.053
wave 0.092 0.063 0.057
NA CF non-wave 0.074 0.061   
wave 0.078 0.063   
NA CF-L non-wave 0.064 0.075 0.009
wave 0.066 0.073 0.011
A non-wave 826.33 2255.68   
wave 391.16 1985.99   
A-L non-wave 1940.28 8879.55 5426.89
wave 2101.66 4869.11 8120.11
NA A non-wave 128.44 95.13   
wave 136.68 74.43   
NA A-L non-wave 893.89 1216.96 1682.34
wave 788.27 582.97 2160.25
Lev non-wave 0.21 0.25   
wave 0.23 0.22   
Lev-L non-wave 0.18 0.22 0.24
wave 0.21 0.21 0.26
NA Lev non-wave 0.14 0.16   
wave 0.14 0.15   
NA Lev-L non-wave 0.17 0.19 0.24
wave 0.16 0.19 0.24
q-L non-wave 1.14 0.89 1.55
wave 1.64 1.94 1.82
NA q-L non-wave 1.05 0.85 1.53
 wave 1.41 1.6 1.72
 
Note: Wave and non-wave periods, and variable abbreviations are 
explained in Table 4b. 
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Table 4b: Sample periods and variable definitions for Table 4 
  UK Cont.Eur. US 
sample-period 1991-2004 1991-2004 1991-2002
wave-period 1997-2001 1997-2001 1995-2002
     
     
Variables 
M deal value (in millions USD) 
S percentage of largest shareholder 
CF cash flow over total assets (lag 1) 
A total assets (in millions USD) 
Lev leverage (= non-current liabilities / A) 
Q Tobin’s q (= (market capitalization + non-
current liabilities) / A) 
-L [Variable] for listed firms 
NA [Variable] for non-acquirers 
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Table 5: Regression Results 
  UK  Cont.Eur. US 
  All  Listed  All  Listed  Listed 
  Coeff  Coeff  Coeff  Coeff  Coeff 
        
P/E  -0.0062  0.0095  -0.0085  0.0071  0.0055 
  (-3.25)  (4.52) (-3.15) (2.67) (3.06) 
P/E-L  0.0169    0.0286     
  (8.24)  (8.77)  
S  -0.0012  -0.0019  -0.0011  -0.0021  -0.0005 
  (-4.55)  (-4.99) (-2.74) (-4.66) (-2.08) 
S-L  -0.0019    -0.0019     
  (-5.88)  (-3.31)  
CF  0.241  0.1533  -0.0458  -0.3798  0.1232 
  (4.08)  (2.74) (-0.32) (-2.67) (4.58) 
CF-L  0.2072    -0.2699     
  (2.70)  (-1.29)  
ln(A)  0.0238  0.0241  0.1211  0.0702  0.0344 
  (7.20)  (7.24) (16.44) (11.16) (15.50) 
ln(A)-L  0.009    -0.0073     
  (2.46)  (-1.14)  
Lev  0.0573  0.0783  -0.0491  -0.0114  0.1442 
  (2.30)  (2.30) (-0.86) (-0.19) (6.52) 
Lev-L  0.0595    -0.0024     
  (1.59)  (-0.03)  
q-L    0.029    0.0366  0.0275 
    (6.67) (4.99) (9.56) 
           
N  64,164  3,028  115,879  3,661  14,855 
Psd-R2  0.4703  0.1075  0.3644  0.1616  0.0557 
Note: t-values in parentheses. Variables abbreviated as in Table 4b. 
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Table 6: Expected Values and Marginal Effects 
 
E(y|x) E(y|y>0,x) ∂E(y|x) ∂(P/E) 
McDonald-Moffitt decomp. 
at: 
increased 
size of acq. 
increased 
number of acq. 
Cont. Eur.
means 0.0163 13.76  
means,P/E=15, listed=1 17.65 0.0339 10.73 89.23
means,P/E=30, listed=1 21.46 0.1318 14.88 85.12
means,P/E=15, listed=0 13.91 -0.0012 -7.07 -92.93
means,P/E=30, listed=0 13.06 -0.0005 -6.31 -93.69
UK 
means 0.1133 10.62  
means,P/E=15, listed=1 13.54 0.0673 14.74 85.26
means,P/E=30, listed=1 16.26 0.1646 19.74 80.26
means,P/E=15, listed=0 10.51 -0.0060 -9.63 -90.37
means,P/E=30, listed=0 9.68 -0.0026 -8.33 -91.67
US 
means 2.7511 17.89  
means,P/E=15, listed=1 17.31 0.0743 18.68 81.32
means,P/E=30, listed=1 18.99 0.1074 21.54 78.46
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Notes: 
1 See, for example, Dewing (1921), National Industrial Conference Board (1929), Livermore (1935), and 
discussion in Markham (1955) and Hogarty (1970). 
2 Ralph Nelson (1959, 1966) was the first to document the link between merger activity and share prices, and 
numerous subsequent studies have confirmed this finding.  See, for example, Melicher, Ledolter and D’Antonio 
(1983), Geroski (1984) for the US, and Geroski (1984) and Clarke and Ioannidis (1996) for the UK. 
3  One difficulty in answering this question arises, because most studies of mergers’ effects on profits or 
shareholder wealth do not concentrate on mergers during wave years. 
4  See, Hannah and Kay (1977), Resende (1999) and Gärtner and Halbheer (2007). 
5 See, Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002); and Harford (2005).  Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2005); and 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003).  
6 Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004); Shleifer and Vishny (2003); and Gugler, Mueller and Yurtoglu 
(2007). 
7 Gärtner and Halbheer (2007) present econometric evidence establishing that the merger activity in the USA 
and UK at the end of the 1990s was indeed a wave – that is a statistically significant surge in mergers compared 
to earlier years. 
8 See Andrade and Stafford (2004), and Erard and Schaller (2002). 
9 See, for example, Chappell and Cheng (1984), Andrade and Stafford (2004), and Jovanovic and Rousseau 
(2002). 
10 Robin Marris (1964, 1998) was the first to posit growth as an objective for managers, and Mueller (1969) 
applied the theory to explain the conglomerate merger wave of the late 1960s.  For recent evidence linking 
managerial income to growth through mergers, see Khorana and Zenner (1998). 
11 A further justification for including q in the managers’ utility function would be that managers own shares in 
the firm. 
12 See, Grabowski and Mueller (1972), Vogt (1994), Hay and Liu (1998), and Gugler, Mueller and Yurtoglu 
(2004). 
13 To our knowledge Schwartz (1984) is the only study testing the MDH for mergers.  He does not link his 
results to merger waves, however. 
14  Evidence of this for the United States is presented in Gugler, Mueller and Yurtoglu (2007). 
